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INTRODUCTION 
Like other states that formed part of the Confederacy, North Carolina 
has had a history of racial prejudice, including executing African Americans 
at high rates and excluding African Americans from serving on juries.1 
However in 2009, the North Carolina Legislature passed the North Carolina 
Racial Justice Act, making it the first state to allow courts to consider 
statistical evidence bearing on discrimination—the type of evidence that the 
United States Supreme Court refused to allow in McCleskey v. Kemp.2 David 
Baldus’s important corpus of scholarship, especially his famous research in 
McCleskey and his many subsequent articles bearing on racial fairness, 
provides an opportunity to reflect on why race matters in the context of the 
Racial Justice Act. 
The North Carolina Racial Justice Act provides: “No person shall be 
subject to or given a sentence of death or shall be executed pursuant to any 
judgment that was sought or obtained on the basis of race.”3 In contrast to 
the United States Supreme Court ruling in McCleskey, the Act specifically 
allows an appellate court reviewing a death sentence to consider statistical 
evidence or other evidence showing: 
(1) Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more 
frequently upon persons of one race than upon persons of another 
race. 
(2) Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more 
frequently as punishment for capital offenses against persons of 
one race than as punishment of capital offenses against persons of 
another race. 
(3) Race was a significant factor in decisions to exercise 
peremptory challenges during jury selection.4 
Under the Act, if a defendant successfully shows that racial 
considerations played a significant part in the prosecution’s decision to seek 
 
 1. Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race 
and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2070–76; see also Brief of the North 
Carolina State Conference of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant’s Motion 
for Appropriate Relief Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act, State v. LeGrande, No. 95 CRS 56 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2010). 
 2. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In 2011, the new Republican-dominated 
legislature passed a bill essentially nullifying the Act, but on December 14, 2011, Governor 
Beverly Perdue vetoed the bill. Gary D. Robertson, Beverly Perdue, North Carolina Governor, Vetoes 
Repeal of Racial Justice Act, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/12/14/racial-justice-act-bev-perdue-death-penalty_north_carolina_n_1148776.html. 
 3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2011); see also Sam Favate, North Carolina Senate Rewrites 
Racial Justice Act; Gov Urged To Veto Changes, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Nov. 30, 2011, 3:15 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/30/north-carolina-senate-rewrites-racial-justice-act-gov-
urged-to-veto-changes/. 
 4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(b). 
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or impose the death sentence, the court is required to vacate the death 
sentence and to resentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.5 The Act permits both white defendants and black 
defendants to challenge their sentences on this basis.6 To date, 153 persons 
on North Carolina’s death row have used the Act to appeal their sentence.7 
Professors Catherine M. Grosso and Barbara O’Brien conducted a study 
of North Carolina death penalty cases (hereinafter the “MSU Study”) that is 
impressive in its scope and methodological rigor.8 The results of the study 
have become the focus of appellants challenging their death sentences 
under the Act.9 The MSU research examined all but one of the state’s 173 
capital cases decided between 1990 and 2010: The findings demonstrate 
that prosecutors consistently exercised peremptory challenges at a 
significantly higher rate against prospective black jurors than against 
members of other racial groups.10 
The first court hearings under the Act began in January 2012 and are 
likely to play out over a number of years.11 However, the MSU research has 
already borne fruit in the case of Marcus Reymond Robinson.12 Mr. 
Robinson was found guilty of murder in 1994 and sentenced to death. 
Appeals were unsuccessful and his execution by lethal injection was 
scheduled for January 26, 2007, but a civil action challenging the lethal 
injection protocol stayed the execution. 
In August 2009, Mr. Robinson filed a motion for appropriate relief 
pursuant to the Racial Justice Act. In an extensive evidentiary hearing 
involving testimony by Professor Grosso and others, including rebuttal 
evidence by the State, the presiding judge concluded that “race was a 
significant factor in jury selection.”13 For instance, African American jurors 
in Mr. Robinson’s trial were peremptorily challenged at rates three times 
 
 5. Id. § 15A-2012(a)(3). 
 6. See, e.g., id. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012; Robertson, supra note 2. 
 7. John Chappell, DA Questions Racial Justice Act in Court Filings, PILOT (Southern Pines, 
N.C.) (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.thepilot.com/news/2012/feb/17/da-questions-racial-justice-
act-court-filings/. 
 8. See Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara A. O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming 
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1531 (2012). 
 9. See, e.g., Motion for Appropriate Relief Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act at 34, State 
v. Allen, 2010 WL 5864197 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2010) (Nos. 99 CRS 3818, 3820); Motion 
for Imposition of Life Sentence Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act at 3, State v. Campbell, 2010 
WL 5763853 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2010) (No. 00 CRS 473–74); Motion for Appropriate 
Relief Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act at 3, State v. Maness, 2010 WL 5792748 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 5, 2010) (No. 05 CRS 50338). 
 10. Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 8, at 1548. 
 11. First Hearing Under NC Racial Justice Act Begins, GASTON GAZETTE (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://gastongazette.com/articles/hearing-66758-justice-racial.html. 
 12. State v. Robinson, No. CRS 23143 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012). 
 13. Id. at 160–67. 
A7_VIDMAR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2012  11:13 AM 
1972 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1969 
greater than white jurors. In consequence, Mr. Robinson’s sentence of death 
was vacated and he was resentenced to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole. 
More litigation, involving other appeals under the Racial Justice Act will 
follow this initial victory. 
WHY RACIAL BIAS HARMS THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In the remainder of this short Essay, I briefly outline three reasons why 
racial discrimination in death penalty cases—and indeed in all criminal and 
civil cases—harms the American justice system, regardless of whether the 
juries are composed exclusively of white persons or composed with only 
token black jurors. Specifically, the criminal justice system is delegitimized in 
three distinct—and unacceptable—ways: 
(1) Systematic exclusion of death-qualified African American jurors 
negatively affects a jury’s deliberative thoroughness and ultimately the 
accuracy and fairness of the jury’s verdict bearing on life or death; 
(2) Systematic exclusion of death-qualified African American jurors 
from capital trials raises the very realistic specter that both conscious and 
unconscious racism could have been present in those trials; and 
(3) Systematic exclusion of African Americans from capital juries affects 
the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system, especially in the eyes 
of the large African American community, but also in the eyes of white 
residents and other minority groups.14 
A. DELIBERATIVE ACCURACY OF THE JURY 
A crucial task of the jury is to have twelve members from different walks 
of life examine the evidence during trial, evaluate it, and then in subsequent 
deliberation bring together all of the perspectives of the members in order 
to reach a verdict. African Americans have unique social and cultural life 
experiences that can provide insight into the evidence: for example, the 
social and physical context in which a killing occurred; the reliability of 
witnesses; the potential motives of the accused; the background of the 
accused; and other factors, including the weight that should be given to 
each piece of evidence. In Peters v. Kiff, Justice Thurgood Marshall asserted 
that the group-based exclusion of jurors “deprives the jury of a perspective 
on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that 
may be presented.”15 
Research conducted by legal anthropologist Daniel Swett specifically 
demonstrates how non-diverse juries may lack multi-cultural perspectives 
 
 14. While this Essay’s primary focus is on capital trials, the implications of racial exclusion 
obviously apply to other criminal trials and also to civil trials. 
 15. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 50304 (1972). 
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and the ability to carefully consider the evidence.16 One trial that was the 
focus of Swett’s research took place before an all-white jury and white judge. 
It involved a charge of first-degree murder against an African American man 
accused of shooting and killing another African American man in a pool-
room dispute. The killer, the victim, and the only witnesses to the event were 
from an inner-city culture.17 The defendant admitted to the shooting, but 
claimed the dead man was actually the aggressor and that he had merely 
been defending himself. The witnesses to the shooting, all from the inner 
city, unanimously supported the defendant and testified that the deceased 
man had put the defendant “in the dozens.” It was clear from the judge’s 
attempt to clarify the testimony and the puzzlement on the jurors’ faces that 
the jurors were totally confused by the testimony. As Professor Swett 
documented, the white jurors’ unfamiliarity with the witnesses’ inner-city 
vocabulary and subculture, especially with respect to the continuously 
repeated phrase “in the dozens,” led the jury to return a verdict of murder 
in the second degree based solely on the ground that the defendant 
admitted that he shot the other man. If even a single African American had 
been on the jury, it is likely that he or she could have explained to the other 
jurors that the defendant’s and the witnesses’ testimony about “in the 
dozens” was reference to an extreme form of verbal aggression usually 
directed against the person’s mother that frequently leads to violence. In the 
case before the jury, the aggression was initiated by the deceased man 
against the defendant. This knowledge could have been critical to the jury in 
assessing a claim of self-defense. At minimum, it meant the homicide was 
manslaughter, rather than murder. 
The recent 2010 exoneration of Shawn Massey after twelve years in a 
North Carolina prison, although not a death penalty case, helps to show that 
Professor Swett’s examples are not a relic of history or an anomaly.18 Mr. 
Massey, a young black man was convicted of robbery and kidnapping by an 
all-white jury after a white victim described her assailant as having hair 
“pulled back from the front with 4 or 5 braids hanging down the back.” 
After Massey was arrested the victim, although expressing some doubts, said 
Massey “most” looked like her assailant even though Massey did not have 
braids. Moreover, Massey and his family insisted he had never had braids. 
Yet, because of the victim’s description, police and prosecutors incorrectly 
assumed the victim’s attacker had braids only on the back of his head. They 
did not understand her trial testimony that the braids went over his head 
 
 16. For a detailed explanation of this study see Daniel H. Swett, Cultural Bias in the 
American Legal System, 4 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79 (1969). 
 17. Id. at 9798. 
 18. This case is unreported; Mr. Massey’s story is recounted more fully in the files of Duke 
Law School’s Center for Criminal Justice and Professional Responsibility and an August 25, 
2010 letter to Governor Beverly E. Perdue from Prosecutor Eric H. Cottrell in support of Shawn 
Giovanni Massey’s Application for a Pardon of Innocence. 
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from front to back, the hairstyle known as having “cornrows.” Prosecutors, 
defense counsel, and presumably the jurors, assumed that the seven pictures 
of Mr. Massey without cornrows, some as recent as eleven weeks before the 
assault, had little significance because the pictures did not show the back of 
Mr. Massey’s head; and they assumed he could have cut off the braids 
following the assault and robbery. Only recently were investigators from the 
Duke University School of Law’s Wrongful Conviction Clinic able to show 
that it would have been impossible for Mr. Massey to have grown hair long 
enough to have it braided into cornrows—something the white police and 
prosecutors never considered. 
Empirical research has consistently confirmed the wisdom of a truly 
representative jury. In one such study, Samuel Sommers created an 
experiment comparing six-person juries composed exclusively of white 
persons with juries composed of four white and two black members.19 The 
racially mixed juries engaged in longer deliberations, discussed a wider 
range of information, and were more accurate in their statements about the 
case. Interestingly, this was not simply the result of distinctive behavior on 
the part of black jurors in the mixed juries. White jurors acted quite 
differently depending on whether they were members of all-white or mixed 
juries. Compared to whites in the homogeneous juries, whites in mixed 
juries appeared to be more careful and systematic in their decision-making: 
they made fewer factual mistakes and raised more pieces of evidence and 
issues in their deliberations. A substantial body of research on jury decision-
making is generally supportive of Sommers’ findings.20 After an exhaustive 
review of research devoted to the study of racial effects on jury decision-
making, researchers Sommers and Ellsworth concluded “that the racial 
composition of the jury influenced the content and scope of the discussions. 
Compared to all-White juries, racially mixed juries tended to deliberate 
longer, discuss more case facts, and bring up more questions about what was 
missing from the trial . . . .”21 
Research also shows that the incidence of superficial deliberations by 
all-white juries involving black defendants often cannot be cured simply by 
placing a single token black person on the jury. As far back as the 1950s, 
social psychologists began to document a finding that in circumstances 
where a single member of a group holds opinions that are different from the 
 
 19. For an in-depth explanation of this study, see Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity 
and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006). 
 20. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205. In a compelling essay, Richard Lempert also identified multiple 
ways that diversity could enhance fact-finding. See Richard O. Lempert, Uncovering 
“Nondiscernible” Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 67071 
(1975). 
 21. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race 
and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1028 (2003). 
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majority opinions, that person is highly likely to withhold dissent and just go 
along with the majority.22 However, if that person has an ally, he or she is 
likely to express that opinion and defend it. Over the intervening decades, 
hundreds of studies have confirmed this finding, labeled the “Asch effect” 
after the psychologist who identified it.23 Put in the context of the current 
discussion, the absence of a critical mass of black jurors may often have the 
same detrimental effect on deliberations as the complete absence of black 
jurors. In other words, even when there is a lone black person on the jury, 
there is still a significant chance that cultural perspectives bearing on guilt 
or sentencing may not be heard. 
In the context of such findings as summarized above, there is a very 
reasonable likelihood that some, if not all, of the North Carolina juries 
composed exclusively of white persons (or those including just one black 
person) that rendered death verdicts failed to engage in robust 
deliberations and, moreover, failed to understand and weigh pieces of 
evidence bearing on guilt and on factors bearing on mitigation. 
Vidmar and Hans summarized the representativeness issue this way: 
The idea of a representative jury is a compelling one. A jury of 
people with a wide range of backgrounds, life experiences, and 
world knowledge will promote accurate fact-finding for several 
reasons. . . . [A] diverse group is likely to hold varying perspectives 
on the evidence, encouraging more thorough debate over what the 
evidence proves. . . . [T]he inclusion of minorities and women in a 
representative jury adds their life experiences and insights to the 
collective pool of knowledge. Research on heterogeneous decision-
making groups supports the claim that diverse juries are better fact-
finders. Minority jurors contribute their unique knowledge to the 
general discussion. Furthermore, when whites anticipate 
participating in a diverse jury, they tend to give more careful 
assessment of the evidence.24 
B. CONFRONTING EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
The case involving African American defendant, Robert Bacon, helps to 
illustrate the problems of explicit and implicit racial prejudice. Mr. Bacon, a 
black man, was sentenced to death twice by all-white juries in a North 
Carolina county whose population was made up of approximately twenty 
 
 22. See, e.g., Michael A. Hogg, Influence and Leadership, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 1179–89 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010) 
 23. For a general review of this literature, see id. 
 24. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 74 (2007) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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percent African Americans.25 In his first trial in 1987, the jury convicted and 
sentenced Bacon to death for murdering the white husband of his white 
girlfriend in a plot that his girlfriend masterminded.26 In a separate trial, 
Bacon’s white girlfriend was also convicted of first-degree murder. However, 
unlike Bacon, she was sentenced to life in prison.27 Because of legal 
irregularities in the first trial, Bacon received a second trial on his sentence; 
but like the first trial, the verdict was death even though the jury found that 
Bacon had no prior history of violent behavior and had acted under the 
domination of his girlfriend.28 
Later, a female juror, Pamela Bloom Smith, who served on Bacon’s 
resentencing jury, stated in a sworn declaration that some jurors felt that it 
was wrong for a black man to date a white woman.29 Moreover, she also said 
that some jurors expressed the view that black people commit more crime 
and that it is typical of blacks to be involved in crime. Smith also stated that 
some jurors were adamant in their feeling that Bacon was a black man and 
deserved what he got. According to this juror, the majority of jurors were 
impatient with those jurors who initially wanted to sentence Bacon to life 
without parole—they complained that it should have been an easy decision 
and that the jury was taking too long.30 
While Bacon’s case appears to have involved explicit racial bias, United 
States Supreme Court case law commentary concludes, and social science 
research demonstrates, that all-white juries—even those comprised of 
citizens who honestly consider themselves race-neutral and fair-minded— 
may tend to exhibit implicit as well as explicit racial biases in their decisions. 
The presence of black citizens on juries has been shown to alleviate the risks 
that both conscious and subconscious racial bias may impact criminal justice 
decisions.31 In Georgia v. McCollum, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor observed 
that “conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors 
perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps 
determining the verdict of guilt or innocence.”32 
 
 25. See Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Racial Discrimination, Inept Defense, and 
Basic Unfairness Make Pending North Carolina Execution Closer to the Norm (May 11, 2001), 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/22. 
 26. Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 473 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 27. Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 25. 
 28. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 475. 
 29. See Declaration of Pamela Bloom Smith (May 10, 2010), for Ms. Smith’s full statement. 
 30. In 2001, Governor Michael F. Easley commuted Bacon’s death sentence to life 
imprisonment without parole. Press Release, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Governor Consigns 
Bacon to Life in Prison Without Parole (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/ 
dop/deathpenalty/bacon_commuted.htm. 
 31. See, e.g., Sommers, supra note 19, at 597. 
 32. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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In 1993, Professor Nancy King reviewed the then-existing body of 
research on race and juries.33 She concluded that, overall, the research 
indicated that “whenever a connection [between verdicts and juror race] 
exists . . . white jurors are harsher with black defendants and more lenient 
with those charged with crimes against black victims than black jurors.”34 
Consistent with Justice O’Connor’s observation, racial effects do not always 
result from conscious racism. Social psychologists use the term “implicit 
bias” as a term to describe the psychological phenomenon, demonstrated in 
a substantial body of research, whereby even persons who see themselves as 
liberals on race issues nevertheless often make implicit assumptions about 
African Americans based on subtle stereotypes.35 A series of studies have 
found that whites who professed an egalitarian philosophy were nevertheless 
quick to attribute negative personality traits to African Americans and 
positive personality traits to whites.36 Many other studies unquestionably lead 
to a conclusion that people who sincerely believe themselves to be non-
prejudiced often harbor anti-African American assumptions that influence 
their behavior and decision-making.37 The following findings from 
experimental studies demonstrate the presence of implicit racial bias in 
juror decision-making. 
An experiment by Johnson et al. involved a simulated trial in which 
white persons serving as jurors learned about circumstantial evidence that 
incriminated the defendant, but the circumstantial evidence was ruled 
inadmissible.38 The defendant was described as either white or black. The 
results showed that the jurors ignored the incriminating circumstantial 
evidence when the defendant was described as white, but, despite its judicial 
proscription, used it in their decisions when he was described as black. In 
another experiment, Sommers & Ellsworth asked 156 white persons to give 
their opinions about the guilt of a defendant accused of assaulting his 
 
 33. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 21, at 1003. 
 34. Id. (quoting Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the 
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 85 (1993)). 
 35. See generally John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Bias, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 22, at 1084; Vincent Yzerbyt & Stéphanie Demoulin, Intergroup 
Relations, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 22, at 1024. 
 36. See generally Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 21. 
 37. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006) (“[E]vidence from hundreds of 
thousands of individuals across the globe shows that (1) the magnitude of implicit bias toward 
members of out groups or disadvantaged groups is large, (2) implicit bias often conflicts with 
conscious attitudes, endorsed beliefs, and intentional behavior, [and] (3) implicit bias 
influences evaluations of and behavior toward those who are the subject of the bias . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 38. For the details regarding this experiment, see James D. Johnson et al., Justice Is Still Not 
Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 893, 893–96 (1995). 
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girlfriend in a bar.39 In a race-salient version of the event, the defendant 
allegedly yelled: “You know better than to talk that way about a White (or 
Black) man in front of his friends.”40 In another version, the defendant was 
quoted merely as saying “to talk that way about a man in front of his 
friends.”41 When race was made salient, as in the first scenario, the ratings of 
guilt were about equal for both black and white defendants. However, when 
race was not made salient, as in the second version, “[w]hites gave higher 
guilt ratings . . . to the [b]lack defendant than the [w]hite defendant” and 
rated him as more aggressive and violent than the white defendant and 
more likely to commit a crime in the future.42 In summarizing a similar 
study, Sommers and Ellsworth reported that “[r]acially mixed juries were . . . 
more likely to discuss racial issues such as racial profiling during 
deliberations, and more often than not, Whites on these heterogeneous 
juries were the jurors who raised these issues.”43 Those authors further 
concluded: “[S]imply knowing that they would be discussing the case with a 
racially heterogeneous group was sufficient to influence jurors’ private 
judgments.”44 And as the findings showed, those private judgments were 
unfavorable to African Americans. 
The Sommers and Ellsworth review concluded that the findings 
concerning racial issues involved complex interactions with the type of 
evidence.45 For example, when race was made explicitly salient the 
simulating jurors were on guard against making racially based assumptions, 
but when the case was described without an explicit mention of race the 
subtle stereotypes came into play.46 Furthermore, these findings are 
consistent with a large body of research demonstrating the subtle, but often 
invidious, effects of perceptions of African Americans and judgments about 
criminal behaviors. 
These experimental results need to be considered along with the 
findings of David Baldus and his co-authors, who, by examining actual case 
files, demonstrated that the killing of a white person compared to a black 
person increased the likelihood of a defendant being sentenced to death, 
and, moreover, that black defendants who killed white victims were more 
 
 39. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 21, at 101415. 
 40. Id. at 1015 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1028. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 101416. 
 46. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of 
Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 137576 
(2000). 
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likely than white persons to receive death sentences.47 Subsequently, 
Jennifer Eberhardt and her colleagues used the Baldus et al. database to ask 
an important question about subtle effects of race of the defendant.48 Using 
photographs of actual African American defendants, Eberhardt and her co-
authors had the photographs independently rated according to the degree 
to which the defendants had features that were stereotypically African 
American.49 They found that defendants with such stereotypical African 
American features were more likely to receive a death sentence when they 
were convicted of murdering white victims.50 The best explanation for this 
finding is that the subtle effects of race influenced the decisions of judges 
and/or juries in a direction that favored death. 
In his award-winning book, Craig Haney expanded upon those basic 
research insights about conscious and unconscious racial bias.51 He 
concluded: 
Attributing deeper and more negative traits and motives to 
minority group members in our society—traits and motives that are 
represented and perceived as natural, intrinsic, and immutable—
makes it even more difficult for whites to appreciate the role of 
social history and present circumstances in shaping the life course 
of African Americans.52 
Professor Haney described experiments that confirmed the effects of race 
issues among white jurors. In a review of fourteen different studies 
conducted by various researchers, he concluded that jurors sentenced 
differently as a result of the racial characteristics of the case. Haney and a 
collaborator followed up this finding with their own research using samples 
of death-qualified, jury-eligible adults.53 The study varied the race of the 
defendants and the race of the victims. Haney summarized the findings as 
follows: 
[W]e found that . . . white participants interpreted aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances differently as a function of the racial 
characteristics of the case. In particular, they tended to weigh 
 
 47. David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: 
An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 
(1998). 
 48. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black 
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006). 
 49. Id. at 383–84. 
 50. Id. at 385. Notably, the researchers “found that the perceived stereotypicality of Black 
defendants convicted of murdering Black victims did not predict death sentencing.” Id. 
 51. CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SYSTEM (2005). 
 52. Id. at 204. 
 53. Id. at 205. Haney also used samples of students and obtained essentially the same 
results. Id. at 204–05. 
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aggravating circumstances more heavily when the defendant was 
African American. Similarly, they were reluctant to attach much 
significance at all to mitigating circumstances when they were 
offered on behalf of an African American defendant. The 
participants also mentioned “stereotype-consistent” reasons for 
their sentencing verdicts (i.e., negative qualities of the African 
American defendants), and they appeared less able or willing to 
empathize with or enter the world of African American 
defendants.54 
Haney also reported that his research showed that 
white jurors sentenced African American defendants to death more 
often than they did whites. There was about a 10-percentage-point 
overall difference that was determined by race—white defendants 
were given death sentences a little more than 40% of the time, 
African American defendants a little more than 50%. The harshest 
sentencing occurred in the black defendant/white victim 
condition, where death sentences were rendered by 54% of the 
participants.55 
Although the effects of implicit bias in jury deliberations, verdicts, and 
sentencing is well documented, research findings indicate that the presence 
of African Americans on the jury is likely to reduce the outright expression 
of racial bias. Even if jury members have strong biases, diversity ensures a 
range of biases, which can cause the jurors to examine the assumptions 
behind their individual perspectives during deliberations and thereby 
explore the testimony and other evidence more thoroughly. 
In summary, research indicates that juries that exclude African 
Americans are more likely to exhibit racial biases, even if they believe they 
are fair-minded and not racially biased. Conversely, the presence of African 
Americans on juries helps to prevent such biases from tainting the 
deliberations. 
C. SERIOUS HARM TO THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
The United States Supreme Court’s 1970 opinion in In re Winship held 
for the first time that the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.56 In describing the societal interests in the reliability of 
jury verdicts, the Court said: 
 The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has [a] 
vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The 
 
 54. Id. at 205. 
 55. Id. 
 56. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
A7_VIDMAR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2012  11:13 AM 
2012] FAIRNESS IN DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION 1981 
accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of 
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may 
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that 
he would be stigmatized by the conviction. . . . 
 Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable 
to command the respect and confidence of the community in 
applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of 
the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves 
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.57 
In short, the United States’ constitutionally required procedures have two 
functions: one is fairness to the individual; the second is ensuring the 
confidence of the community. Both are critical to the moral force of the law, 
its acceptance, and consequent compliance with laws. 
Almost four decades ago, social psychologist John Thibaut and law 
professor Laurens Walker published their seminal studies on what makes 
people evaluate the legal system as fair or unfair.58 Following their path-
breaking research, literally hundreds of studies have investigated factors that 
people use to evaluate whether legal procedures are fair, an issue that has a 
direct bearing on whether citizens view a justice system as fair and impartial 
and thus should be accorded legitimacy.59 One central implication of these 
studies’ findings is that the opportunity to participate in the legal system is 
critically important in evaluations of a system’s legitimacy.60 
From a normative perspective, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized the need for legitimacy of the legal system in many cases, 
especially in the context of race. For example, in 1991, the Court in 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. asserted: 
 Race discrimination within the courtroom raises serious 
questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there. 
Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents 
the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality. In the 
many times we have addressed the problem of racial bias in our 
system of justice, we have not “questioned the premise that racial 
discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the 
 
 57. Id. at 36364. 
 58. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975). 
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dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts.” To permit racial 
exclusion in this official forum compounds the racial insult 
inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin.61 
The Court made a similar statement in Powers v. Ohio: 
[The process of excluding racial minorities] invites cynicism 
respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the 
law. The cynicism may be aggravated if race is implicated in the 
trial, either in a direct way as with an alleged racial motivation of 
the defendant or a victim, or in some more subtle manner as by 
casting doubt upon the credibility or dignity of a witness, or even 
upon the standing or due regard of an attorney who appears in the 
cause.62 
While excluding African Americans from serving on capital juries harms 
accurate fact-finding and removes obstacles to the expression of conscious 
and subconscious racial bias, it also, as the Court in Edmonson observed, 
harms the legitimacy of verdicts. This is likely to be especially true for 
Americans who also happen to be African Americans. 
CONCLUSION 
Much more could be said about racial issues and their relevance to 
North Carolina’s Racial Justice Act. For present purposes, however, it is 
sufficient to observe that David Baldus’s seminal work on racial unfairness in 
McCleskey and his subsequent corpus of research formed the intellectual 
groundwork for the development of the Act. The research by Grosso and 
O’Brien is a direct descendant of Baldus’s work and of a quality and rigor 
that is consistent with his extremely high standards. Dozens of North 
Carolina death row inmates are now challenging their sentences based on 
racial disparities. That litigation is still in its early stages and even though 
Marcus Reymond Robinson has had his death sentence overturned, it is yet 
unclear how other North Carolina courts will ultimately respond to the clear 
evidence of racial bias, especially in the light of a very recent development. 
On June 21, 2012, the North Carolina General Assembly modified the 
Racial Justice Act, overriding a veto by the Governor. Republicans gained 
control of the Assembly in the 2010 elections and almost immediately set 
out to change the relevance of statistical evidence. The revised Act states that 
“[s]tatistical evidence alone is insufficient to establish that race was a 
significant factor” in jury selection and that “[t]he State may offer evidence 
in rebuttal of the claims or evidence of the defendant, including, but not 
 
 61. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)). 
 62. Powers, 499 U.S. at 412. 
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limited to, statistical evidence.”63 Despite this setback, litigation on behalf of 
death row inmates is continuing and will likely be before North Carolina 
courts for many years.  
In this brief Essay, I have sketched three important reasons, backed by 
empirical research, that indicate why David Baldus’s work is so important. 
Racial disparities in jury selection undermine the legitimacy of the legal 
system. On the other hand, racial inclusion increases jury accuracy, it 
mitigates implicit racism, and it fosters legitimacy of legal decisions. Our 
colleague Baldus never lost hope about eventually achieving racial fairness, 
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